Obama, ISIS, and the Distribution of Power in Iraq

September 11, 2014
Jocelyne Cesari
HDS lecturer Jocelyne Cesari. Photo: Rose Lincoln/Harvard Staff Photographer

On September 10, President Barack Obama outlined a strategy to combat the jihadist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) following the recent killings of American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff. The strategy involves the use of force through airstrikes and coalition building among Muslim and Arab nations.

HDS Communications reached out to Jocelyne Cesari, HDS Lecturer on Islamic Studies and director of Harvard's Islam in the West Program, for insight and background about the group and the president's outlined plan.

Harvard Divinity School: The jihadist group calls itself the Islamic State. President Obama said Wednesday night that the group is not Islamic and has a "warped ideology." Is anything ISIS does rooted in Islam? What is their connection, if any, to Islam?

Jocelyne Cesari: This is not a yes or no question. The Islamic State is a radical political group. At the same time, it has a religious vision derived from a specific Islamic interpretation called Salafism, a term that covers different brands and doctrines. The one that inspires ISIS comes from the doctrine of Mohammed Ibn Abdel Wahhab (1703-1792) that became the official religion of the Saudi kingdom.

This form of Salafism privileges the imitation of the Prophet Mohammed at Medina over the teachings and methodology of the Islamic tradition, with the consequence of providing unhistorical, decontextualized interpretations that refuse social and intellectual innovations, but also history, philosophy, and mysticism, which are all part of the Islamic tradition. The irony is that this particular interpretation is seen by Westerners, and some Muslims, as the authentic, traditional Islam while being anti-modernist. It is actually a modern break with the Islamic tradition.

Most of the time, followers of this kind of Salafism focus on enacting a strict puritan way of life and stay away from politics or violence. In their search of purity and authenticity, they tend to be very exclusionary and reject not only all other monotheist faiths, but also Muslims, Shia, or Sunnis who do not follow their particular path.

This Salafi doctrine is only one facet of ISIS. The other facet is the adoption of the Jihad as developed by Al Qaida in Afghanistan as an indiscriminate and global use of violence against what they consider enemies of Islam from states to individuals. In other words, most of Salafis are not jihadis, but jihadis like ISIS are Salafis.

Due to this particular conjunction of Salafism and jihadism, the caliphate promoted by ISIS has nothing to do with the historical experiences of the caliphates from the Ummeyades to the Ottomans. In these periods, the caliph was the supreme political authority ruling over a huge diversity of lands, cultures, and religions. Although non-Muslims were subjects to specific taxes, they were not under death threat from the Muslim power and could actually be quite prosperous (even if some periods were characterized by inter-sectarian violence).

The ISIS caliphate is not a reenactment of these past multicultural empires, but rather a totalitarian modern project (like Communism or Nazism) aiming at religious and ethnic cleansing.

HDS: President Obama said that part of his plan relied on an inclusive Iraqi government, and Secretary of State John Kerry is reaching out to many other Islamic countries with large Sunni populations to speak out against and combat ISIS. Why are those efforts seen as crucial in defeating ISIS?

JC: The main reason for the rise of ISIS is the growing disillusion of the Iraqi Sunnis with the former government of Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who marginalized Sunnis in different areas of politics and public life. The main reason for the influence of ISIS is not religion—even if the war is couched in religious terms—but the imbalance in the distribution of power between Shia and Sunni.

Despite ISIS claims, the caliphate is not the main goal of the Sunni population of Iraq. In fact, the political violence of Sunnis in Iraq is governed primarily by tactical and strategic choices rather than by religious motivations. No doubt that communal antagonism plays a significant role, but it's the outcome, not the cause, of the discriminatory political mechanisms in Iraq.

For this reason, successful conflict regulation requires the recognition and accommodation of the core cause—in this case effective power sharing—rather than a containment of the violent symptoms of the conflict.

HDS: Can the radical ideas of ISIS be extinguished by force or will this effort serve to strengthen and embolden ISIS?

JC: Defeating ISIS is certainly necessary, but not sufficient. It is imperative for the Iraqi rulers to create the conditions for a national reconciliation between Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, and to devise a constitutional compromise that offers each community sufficient protection to eliminate the resort to violence. It is probably easier said than done, especially in the current regional environment and the transnational ideology of ISIS, but it is where the international community, including the U.S., could positively influence Iraqi protagonists.

—by Michael Naughton